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Desire conflicts arise in several real-world contexts. In this paper, we propose a mixed delib-
eration dialogue for reconciliation. A mixed deliberation dialogue is defined as a combination
of forward and backward deliberation dialogues with respective goals are subordinate and su-
perordinate desires of a given desire. This research and the introduction of mixed deliberation
dialogue have been motivated by Kowalski and Toni’s reconciliatory scenario. We show that
an instantiation of a mixed deliberation dialogue implements key parts of Kowalski and Toni’s
reconciliatory solution. We also prove the correctness of mixed deliberation dialogues.
Keywords: Formal dialogue, deliberation, dialogue shift, reconciliation, defeasible inference
rules
1. Introduction
Dialogue theory encompasses various types of descriptive and formal studies, aimed
at various purposes, on the structure of dialogues (van Eemeren et al. 1996). Hin-
tikka’s game-theoretic semantics (Hintikka 1968) and Lorenzen’s dialogue logic
(Lorenzen 1961) explore semantics of language. Hamblin’s formal dialectics (Ham-
blin 1970) explores descriptive or formal dialogue systems. Because formal dialogue
systems can give agents rational interaction and computation mechanisms under
uncertain, incomplete, inconsistent, subjective, and distributed information, they
have received attention from researchers working on formal argumentation (Fan
and Toni 2012, Kok et al. 2010, Prakken 2005, 2006, Wells and Reed 2006).
However, little work has been done for dialogue systems for reconciling conflict
not only by searching for means of satisfying either all or part of given desires, but
also by searching for means for satisfying their underlying desires behind the given
ones. Kowalski and Toni (Kowalski and Toni 1994) first presented arguments for
the necessity of reconciliation in the context of argumentation.
What is interesting about their scenario is that neither the generalized goal nor
reconciliatory solution is obtainable merely by just choosing one of the given al-
ternatives based on utilities or preferences, i.e., quantitative measures, but their
scenario requires some sort of qualitative measure to shift to an underlying desire.
Based on the scenario, they outlined what a generalized goal and a reconciliatory
solution are. However, an open question is how one should have a dialogue to reach
the generalized goal and the reconciliatory solution. These observations motivate
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us to formalize reconciliatory dialogues as consisting of forward and backward de-
liberation dialogues.
This paper contributes to the state-of-the art of studies of formal dialogue and
argumentation by handling the processes leading from conflict detection to justi-
fication of reconciliation in terms of a series of dialogues. Particularly, this paper
gives underlying dialogue and inference principles behind reconciliation. Further-
more, we address Kowalski and Toni’s academically acknowledged scenario that
cannot be solved simply by taking advantage of utilities or preferences assumed in
many formal dialogue-based and argumentation-based approaches.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the research referring to
Kowalski and Toni’s scenario: a running example is used throughout the paper to
describe our proposal. Section 3 presents some preliminary notions that are used
widely to define dialogue goals in Section 4 and dialogue protocols in Section 5. In
Section 6 we proved the correctness of the dialogues with respect to their goals.
Section 7 discusses related work and Section 8 concludes the paper. Proofs of results
are in Appendix A.
2. Motivation
We consider the following realistic reconciliatory scenario demonstrating the im-
portance of goal generalization.
Example 1. (Kowalski and Toni 1994) In a recent head-of-sections committee
meeting in our Department, we discussed the composition of a new resources com-
mittee. Two conflicting arguments were put forward. The Director of Administra-
tion argued that, in the interests of efficiency, the members of the new committee
should consist of himself and the other principal administrative officers of the De-
partment. The Director of Research argued, in opposition to him, that, in the
interests of democracy, the committee should also contain members elected by the
Department.
During the course of the discussion it became clear that the two sides were
focusing on different assumptions about the purpose of the new committee: the
Director of Administration on its purely administrative function, and the Director
of Research on its presumed policy making nature. These two assumptions could
be viewed as conflicting solutions to the more general goals of deciding, on the
one hand, which group should administer resources, and on the other hand, which
group should make policy about resources.
By focusing on the more general goals, it was possible to identify a new solution
which was acceptable to both parties: the resources committee will administer
resources, whereas the head-of-sections committee will make policy about resources.
In the interests of efficiency, the members of the resources committee will consist
of administrative officers only. In the interests of democracy, the head-of-sections
committee will represent the views and interests of the various Department sections
on matters concerning policy about the allocation of resources.
In this scenario, neither a generalized goal nor a reconciliatory solution is ob-
tainable merely by just choosing a given alternative based on utility or preference.
An open question is how one should have a dialogue to reach the generalized goal
and the reconciliatory solution.
Therefore, we formalize reconciliatory dialogues as consisting of forward and
backward deliberation dialogues. We show how shifting between forward and back-
ward deliberation dialogue highlights the linkage with more general goals. On one
hand, the Director of Administration desires efficiency . On the other hand, the
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Figure 1. Rough causal relations behind Kowalski and Toni’s reconciliatory scenario
Director of Research wants to promote democracy via voting although this de-
motes efficiency — forward deliberation. Then, because one outcome of adopting
democracy is fairness, and because there is no reason in favor of not desiring
fairness, we can consider it a “desirable” outcome of the democracy — backward
deliberation. Finally, shifting back to a forward deliberation dialogue, the two more
general goals become evident, because efficiency will be improved if the resources
committee comprises administrative officers only, and fairness will be ensured if
the head committee will take care of making policies related to resources.
In Figure 1, we show rough causal relations behind their scenario with some
additional information where nodes respectively represent statements and arrows,
from node x to node y, attached with + (resp. −) represent x promotes (resp.
demotes) y. For the discussion, we expand Kowalski and Toni’s scenario.
Example 1 (continued). According to Figure 1:
• d represents “the resources committee is democratic”;
• ec represents “the resources committee is efficient”;
• v represents “the resources committee is elected by vote”;
• f represents “the policy is fair”;
• h represents “the head committee makes policy about resources”;
• a represents “the resources committee is composed by administrative officers
only”.
3. Preliminaries
We use Dung’s theory of acceptability semantics (Dung 1995) that reformulates
consequence notions of nonmonotonic logics. The semantics is defined on a pair
AF = 〈AR, attacks〉, called an abstract argumentation framework, where AR is a
set of arguments and attacks is a binary relation on AR, i.e., attacks ⊆ AR×AR.
Definition 1. (Dung 1995) Let AF = 〈AR, attacks〉 be an abstract argumentation
framework, S ⊆ AR and a ∈ AR.
• S is conflict-free iff no a, b ∈ S exists such that a attacks b, i.e., (a, b) /∈ attacks.
• a is acceptable with respect to S iff, for all b ∈ AR, if b attacks a then there is
c ∈ S such that c attacks b .
• The characteristic function, FAF : Pow(AR) → Pow(AR), is defined as
FAF (S) = {a ∈ AR | a is acceptable with respect to S}.
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• S is the grounded extension iff it is the least fixed point of FAF .
Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈AR, attacks〉, we say that an argu-
ment a ∈ AR is justified in AF iff a is in the grounded extension of AF , and
overruled otherwise.
In the following, we consider argumentation frameworks instantiated from L0, a
language of modal propositional logic with single modal operator D representing
the operator “it is desirable that”. L0 is closed under truth-functional operations.
Consequently, if a ∈ L0, then ¬a ∈ L0 and if a, b ∈ L0, then a∨ b, a∧ b, a→ b ∈ L0
etc. L0 conforms to the axiomatic system KD in which D(a → b) → Da → Db
and Da→ ¬D¬a are axioms. Also, L1 consists of so-called defeasible conditionals,
or defaults. They commonly have the forms “a ⇒ b” where a is a conjunction of
literals, i.e., atomic propositions or their negation, in L0 and b is a literal in L0,
and mean that if a is the case, then b is normally the case. Operator D is assumed
not to appear in defeasible conditionals. We assume a fixed, but arbitrary theory
T ⊆ L0 ∪ L1.
Example 1 (continued). To illustrate our proposal, we consider the following ad-
ditional propositions:
• e represents “the policy is effective”;
• m represents “the resources committee makes policy about resources”;
• r represents “the head of sections committee represents various views of inter-
ests”
Moreover, let us consider the following rules, which provide the casual relations
depicted in Figure 1:
v ⇒ d; v ⇒ ¬ec; a⇒ ec; d ∧m⇒ f ;
d ∧m⇒ ¬e; ec ∧m⇒ e; h ∧ r ⇒ f.
Any rule of inference that is not valid with respect to modal logic KD is called
a defeasible inference rule, represented by !. More precisely, a rule of inference
is not valid if it can derive a formula that is not a theorem in KD. Intuitively, an
inference is not valid if it is not deductive in terms of KD. We use letters a, b, c, ...
of the alphabet to represent literals in L0∪L1, lower-case Greek letters α, β, γ, ... to
represent their metavariables of them and A,B,C, ... to represent their sequences.
Definition 2. (Bench-Capon and Prakken 2006) Positive forward practical syl-
logism, denoted by PFPS, and negative forward practical syllogism, denoted by
NFPS, are defined as follows, respectively1.
PFPS : Dα, γ, β ∧ γ ⇒ α! Dβ
NFPS : Dα, γ, β ∧ γ ⇒ ¬α! D¬β
The positive one states intuitively that if one believes that α is desirable (e.g.
“democratic cmte” d), γ is the case and if β (e.g. “voting” v) is realized under
γ is the case then α is satisfied, then one defeasibly concludes that β is desirable
(Dd, v ⇒ d ! Dv). The negative one, however, concludes that β is undesirable
from a different premise stating that if β is realized under γ is the case, then α
1The authors originally call them positive and negative practical syllogisms, respectively, and the conclusion
part of the negative one is ¬Dβ.
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Figure 2. Rough causal relations behind the superordinate desire in Example 1.
is frustrated. We describe them as FPS without distinction. We often silently use
abbreviated forms Dα, β ⇒ α! Dβ and Dα, β ⇒ ¬α! D¬β.
Definition 3. Let Σ ⊆ T , pi ∈ L0∪L1. A sequence A = p1, p2, ..., pn is an argument
from Σ to pn iff (1), for all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), pi ∈ Σ (base case) or pi is derived from
preceding formulae pj(j < i) by application a rule of inference, and (2), for all
i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), the sequence obtained by eliminating pi from A does not satisfy (1).
The first condition states that an argument is a derivation from Σ using strict
and defeasible inference rules. The second assures that an argument consists of a
minimal number of formulae. As described herein Σ ⊢x pn denotes an argument
from Σ to pn where rules of inference are restricted to only x. For example, Σ ⊢FPS
Da represents that Da is derived from Σ by application only positive or negative
forward practical syllogisms zero or more times.
4. Formal Goals of Deliberation Dialogues
4.1. Superordinate and Subordinate Desires
This section provides formal definitions of dialogue goals. Given a desirable outcome
or desire, we use the term superordinate desire to refer to a desire such that, once
it is assumed, it can be a rationale for desiring a given desire, but it cannot be a
rationale for not desiring a given desire. Based on the recognition that the practical
syllogisms give fundamental inference mechanisms for practical reasoning, we give
a formal definition of superordinate desires as follows.
Definition 4. Let Dg,Dh ∈ L0. Dh is a superordinate desire of Dg in T iff
Σ1 ⊆ T exists such that Σ1 ∪ {Dh} ⊢FPS Dg and no Σ2 ⊆ T exists such that
Σ2 ∪ {Dh} ⊢FPS D¬t, for all Dt ∈ T ∪ {Dg}.
Definition 4 states that a superordinate desire Dh derives Dg by application
of only forward practical syllogisms ⊢FPS , but no negation of any desire in T ∪
{Dg} can be derived by their application. It states that h would be desirable
because, once Dh is assumed, it can be a rationale for Dg. Definition 4 is weaker
than the definition replacing Σ to T because it permits T ⊢FPS Dg, i.e., the
situation in which Dg is derived from T without using Dh. Moreover, in general,
a superordinate desire is not intrinsically a desire existing in theory T , but it is
derived by defeasible inferences.
Example 1 (continued). Df is a superordinate desire of Dd in T = {d ∧ m ⇒
f, d∧m⇒ ¬e, ec∧m⇒ e,Dec,m}. However, D¬e is not because of the following
reason. Once D¬e is assumed, Dd is derived from Σ1 = {d ∧m ⇒ ¬e,m}(⊆ T ),
i.e., Σ1 ∪ {D¬e} ⊢FPS Dd. However, once D¬e is assumed, D¬ec is derived from
Σ2 = {ec ∧m ⇒ e,m}(⊆ T ), i.e., Σ2 ∪ {D¬e} ⊢FPS D¬ec. Figure 2 shows rough
causal relations behind this superordinate desire. One can see that Dd is derived
from the assumption Df using FPS. Although it can also be derived from the
assumption D¬e, the assumption results in a derivation of D¬ec that conflicts
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Figure 3. Rough causal relations behind the subordinate desire in Example 1.
with Dec ∈ T .
We introduce a notion of subordinate desires. Given a desire, we use the term
subordinate desire to refer to a desire such that if once it is realized then it satisfies
at least one of the given desires, but it frustrates no desire in them. Namely, a
subordinate desire of a desire is desirable as a means of satisfying the desire, but
not as a means of frustrating any other desire.
Definition 5. Let Dg,Dh ∈ L0. Dg is a subordinate desire of Dh in T iff there
is Σ1 ⊆ T such that Σ1 ∪ {Dh} ⊢FPS Dg and there is no Σ2 ⊆ T such that
Σ2 ∪ {Dt} ⊢FPS D¬g, for all Dt ∈ T ∪ {Dh}.
Definition 5 states that the subordinate desireDg is derived by application only of
forward practical syllogisms, but no desire in T ∪{Dh} derives its negation D¬g by
application of them. It states that g is desirable as a means for satisfying h without
frustrating any desire in T ∪ {Dh}. As with superordinate desires, Definition 5 is
weaker than the definition replacing Σ to T . In general, a subordinate desire is not
intrinsically a desire existing in theory T .
Example 1 (continued). Da is a subordinate desire of Dec in T = {v ⇒ d, v ⇒
¬ec, a⇒ ec,Dd}. However, D¬v is not because, given Σ1 = {v ⇒ ¬ec}, although
Σ1 ∪ {Dec} ⊢FPS D¬v, but given Σ2 = {v ⇒ d}, Σ2 ∪ {Dd} ⊢FPS Dv. Figure 3
shows rough causal relations behind this subordinate desire. It might be readily
apparent that Da is derived from the assumption Dec using FPS. Although D¬v
can also be derived from Dec, it conflicts with Dv derived from Dd ∈ T using
FPS.
4.2. Reconciliatory Desires as a Combination of Superordinate and
Subordinate Desires
Finally, we introduce the notion of reconciliatory desires defined by combining
superordinate desires and subordinate desires.
Definition 6. Let Dg,Dh ∈ L0. Dg is a reconciliatory desire of Dh in T iff
Di ∈ L0 exists such that Di is a superordinate desire of Dh in T and Dg is a
subordinate desire of Di in T .
Definition 6 states that g is desirable because it does not frustrate any desire in
T ∪{Di}, but satisfies i. Here, i is regarded as desirable because, once it is assumed,
it gives a rationale for desiring h. Note that subordinate and superordinate desires
are both special cases of reconciliatory desires.
Example 1 (continued). T = {d∧m⇒ f, d∧m⇒ ¬e, ec∧m⇒ e,m,Dec, h∧r ⇒
f, r}. Dh is a reconciliatory desire of Dd in T because Df is a superordinate desire
of Dd, and Dh is a subordinate desire of Df .
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4.3. Backward Practical Syllogisms
We introduce a backward version of the practical syllogism. This inference pattern,
differently from the traditional forward practical syllogism, represents the result of
a critical thinking approach. Indeed, presuming that α is a desirable outcome (Dα),
and assuming it is true that α⇒ β. Therefore, if α is accepted as desirable, then β,
because it is a material implication deriving from α, should be considered. What
the backward practical syllogism is doing here is to suggest exploration of the world
by defeasibly assuming that Dβ holds too. Clearly, this is the case only if there is
no evidence of the contrary — i.e. that D¬β holds. As we will see in Section 5,
such contrary is formally handled by interaction of inferences in a dialogue, instead
of assuming negation as failure ∼ D¬β meaning that each attempt to prove D¬β
fails.
Definition 7. Positive backward practical syllogism, denoted by PBPS, and neg-
ative backward practical syllogism, denoted by NBPS, are defined as follows.
PBPS : Dα, γ, α ∧ γ ⇒ β ! Dβ
NBPS : Dα, γ,¬α ∧ γ ⇒ β ! D¬β
The positive backward practical syllogism intuitively states that if one believes
that α is desirable (e.g. “cmte democratic” d), γ is the case (e.g. “the resources
committee makes policy about resources”m) and if α is realized under γ is the case
then β is realized (e.g. “fairness” f). Then one defeasibly concludes that β might
be desirable (Dd,m, d∧m⇒ f ! Df). The negative one, however, concludes that
β is undesirable from a different premise stating that if α is not realized under γ
is the case then β is realized. We describe them as BPS without distinction.
An application of BPS sometimes derives a false conclusion. The following ex-
ample shows that how such false conclusions can be withdrawn by an interaction
of BPS.
Example 1 (continued). The following is an application of a backward practical
syllogism.
Dd,m, d ∧m⇒ ¬e! D¬e
Namely, one believes that a democratic resources committee is desirable (i.e., Dd),
the resources committee makes policy about resources (i.e., m) and if d is realized
under m is the case then it demotes efficiency of the policy (i.e., d ∧ m ⇒ ¬e).
From these beliefs, the backward practical syllogism defeasibly derives the belief
that an ineffective policy is desirable (i.e., D¬e).
This is intuitively a false conclusion. As we will see in Section 5, the conclusion is
withdrawn by agent’s belief De or the following another application of a backward
practical syllogism.
Dec,m, ec ∧m⇒ e! De
Namely, one believes that an efficient resources committee is desirable (i.e., Dec),
the resources committee makes policy about resources (i.e., m) and if ec is realized
under m is the case then it promotes efficiency of the policy (i.e., ec ∧ m ! e).
From these beliefs, the backward practical syllogism defeasibly derives the belief
that an effective policy is desirable.
Finally, in this section, we show the fact that backward practical syllogisms
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redefine superordinate desires originally defined by forward practical syllogisms.
Proposition 1. Let Dg,Dh ∈ L0. Dh is a superordinate desire of Dg in T iff
there is Σ1 ⊆ T such that Σ1 ∪ {Dg} ⊢BPS Dh and there is no Σ2 ⊆ T such that
Σ2 ∪ {Dt} ⊢BPS D¬h, for all Dt ∈ T ∪ {Dg}.
5. Formal Protocols of Deliberation Dialogues
5.1. General Elements of Dialogues
This section aims to formalize three types of dialogues: a backward deliberation
dialogue, a forward deliberation dialogue and a mixed deliberation dialogue. Par-
ticularly, this section gives a formal definition of the intersection of backward and
forward deliberation dialogues, as general as possible. In general, there are vari-
ous ingredients associated with formal dialogues, e.g., locution, reply, commitment,
turntaking, termination, and outcomes. In this paper, we only consider locutions,
reply and outcomes because we think that they are necessary and sufficient factors
to cover a key part of reconciliation typified by Kowalski and Toni’s reconciliatory
story. A general framework of reconciliatory dialogues equipped with all of the
ingredients is beyond the scope of this paper although it is true that they make
reconciliatory dialogues more realistic and sound. In our dialogue setting, unspec-
ified number of players exchange moves during dialogues in which they always
have their turn to put forward moves, they are not distinguished from a proponent
and opponent, and their locutions are not subject to consistency check with their
commitments.
Each move in dialogues consists of a speech act — the content of the move —
and a type of dialogue — the context in which moves are put forward.
Definition 8. Let a ∈ L0 ∪ L1. A move is a tuple 〈speech act, type〉 where
speech act ∈ {claim(Dα), why(α), since(Φ ! α), fact(α)} and type ∈ {B,F},
i.e., backward deliberation dialogue or forward deliberation dialogue.
Let us define the set of allowed replies to a move.
Definition 9. Let M be a set of moves and X ∈ {B,F}. The following table
depicts allowed replies to each locution.
Locutions Replies
〈claim(Dα), X〉 〈why(Dα), X〉, 〈claim(D¬α), X〉
〈why(α), X〉 〈since(Φ! α), X〉, 〈fact(α), X〉
〈since(Φ = {. . . , β, . . .}! α), X〉 〈why(β), X〉
〈fact(α), X〉
In the following, if m ∈M is a reply to n ∈M , then we will say that m attacks n
or m −→ n. Particularly, if n = 〈claim(Dα), X〉 and m = 〈claim(D¬α), X〉, then
m −→ n and n −→ m. No move attacks a set of moves nor another move with a
different type.
A dialogue as a network of moves is defined using a dialogue framework. It is an
abstract argumentation framework whose arguments and attacks are instantiated
respectively by moves and attacks on the set of moves.
Definition 10. A dialogue framework is a pair DF = 〈M,attacks〉 where M is a
set of moves and attacks = {〈m,n〉|m,n ∈M,m −→ n}.
Note that dialogue frameworks do not preserve the order in which agents put
forward locutions, but preserve only the replying relation between moves. Agents
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hfact(Dec), F i hfact(v ) ¬ec), F ihfact(v ) d), F ihfact(Dd), F i
hsince(Dec, v ) ¬ec! D¬v), F ihsince(Dd, v ) d! Dv), F i
hwhy(v ) d), F i hwhy(v ) ¬ec), F ihwhy(Dd), F i hwhy(Dec), F i
hwhy(Dv), F i hwhy(D¬v), F ihclaim(D¬v), F ihclaim(Dv), F i
Figure 4. Forward deliberation dialogue with the overruled subject 〈claim(Dv), F 〉 where nodes and links
respectively represent moves and an attack relation.
dynamically construct a network of moves, i.e., a dialogue framework, by replying
to a preceding move in it.
Dung’s acceptability semantics evaluates acceptability of moves in dialogue
frameworks. This is because it is rational to think that moves successfully replying
to critical questions are worthy of acceptance. In general, dialogue frameworks are
constructed by multiple agents who freely participate and make moves from their
private knowledge bases. This knowledge is invisible to others. They can only see
what they said during a dialogue.
Definition 11. Let DF be a dialogue framework. A collaborative theory built from
DF , denoted by T (DF ), is the set {a ∈ L0 ∪L1 | There is a move m in DF whose
speech act is fact(a)}.
5.2. Forward and Backward Deliberation Dialogues
A forward deliberation protocol is defined using forward practical syllogisms.
Definition 12. Let M be a set of moves and DF be a set of dialogue frameworks
and Dh ∈ L0. A forward deliberation dialogue protocol is a function PF : DF → 2
M
where m ∈ PF (DF ) if and only if the following hold.
• m = 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 if DF = ∅.
• m /∈ DF and ∃n ∈ DF such that m −→ n if DF 6= ∅.
Moreover, if the speech act of m is since(A! a), then A! a is an application
of forward practical syllogisms.
A dialogue frameworkDF is a forward deliberation dialogue iffDF is constructed
by the forward deliberation protocol. The first move of DF is called the subject of
the dialogue.
Example 1 (continued). Figure 4 presents an example of a forward deliberation
dialogue with overruled subject 〈claim(Dv), F 〉 in which white moves are justified
and black ones are overruled. The collaborative theory is T (DF ) = {Dd, v ⇒
d,Dec, v ⇒ ¬ec}.
A backward deliberation protocol is defined similarly.
Definition 13. Let M be a set of moves, DF be a set of dialogue frameworks and
Dh ∈ L0. A backward deliberation protocol is a function PB : DF → 2
M where
m ∈ PB(DF ) if and only if the following hold.
• m = 〈claim(Dh), B〉 if DF = ∅.
• m /∈ DF and ∃n ∈ DF such that m −→ n if DF 6= ∅.
Moreover, if the speech act of m is since(A! a), then A! a is an application of
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hclaim(Df), Bi
hfact(d ^m) f), Bihfact(m), Bihfact(Dd), Bi
hsince(Dd,m, d ^m) f ! Df), Bi
hwhy(Df), Bi hwhy(Dd), Bi hwhy(m), Bi hwhy(d ^m) f), Bi
Figure 5. Backward deliberation dialogue with the justified subject 〈claim(Df), B〉.
backward practical syllogisms.
Definition 13 says that the backward deliberation protocol restricts a type of
dialogue to a backward deliberation and an inference to backward practical syllo-
gisms. We say that a dialogue framework DF is a backward deliberation dialogue
iff DF is constructed by the backward deliberation protocol.
Example 1 (continued). Figure 5 presents an example of a backward deliberation
dialogue in which subject 〈claim(Df), B〉 is justified. The collaborative theory is
T (DF ) = {Dd,m, d ∧m⇒ f}.
5.3. Mixed Deliberation Dialogues
We now define mixed deliberation dialogues by which agents search for and justify
reconciliatory desires. We extend the forward and backward protocols so that claim
moves in forward deliberation dialogues serve as a trigger to shift from backward
to forward deliberation dialogues. Formally, a mixed deliberation protocol allows
agents to put forward 〈claim(Dα), B〉 as a reply to 〈why(Dα), F 〉 in mixed de-
liberation dialogues. It is defined based on the forward and backward deliberation
dialogue protocols.
Definition 14. Let N be a set of moves and DF be a set of dialogue frameworks.
A mixed deliberation protocol is a function PM : DF → 2
N , where m ∈ PM (DF )
iff m ∈ PF (DF ) ∪ PB(DF ) or, m = 〈claim(Da), B〉 and 〈why(Da), F 〉 is in DF .
A dialogue framework DF is a mixed deliberation dialogue iff DF is constructed
using the mixed deliberation protocol. Note that forward and backward delibera-
tion dialogues are both special cases of mixed deliberation dialogues.
Example 1 (continued). Figure 6 presents an example of a mixed deliberation
dialogue DF in which the subject claim(Dh) is justified. The collaborative theory
built from DF is T (DF ) = {Dd,m, d ∧m⇒ f, r, h ∧ r ⇒ f}.
6. Correctness of Forward, Backward, and Mixed Deliberation Dialogues
6.1. Forward Deliberation Dialogues for Justifying Subordinate Desires
This section shows the relations between acceptability status of dialogue subjects
and desires of three kinds (subordinate, superordinate, and reconciliatory desires)
defined on collaborative theories. It gives dialogue agents rationale for accepting
and agreeing to dialogue subjects.
We say a dialogue framework is finite if the number of moves in it is finite. We
impose closedness on dialogue frameworks to associate status of subjects and sub-
ordinate, superordinate and reconciliatory desires. A dialogue framework is closed
if it is finite and the corresponding dialogue protocol does not permit to put why
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hfact(d ^m) f), Bihfact(m), Bihfact(Dd), Bi
hclaim(Dh), F i hclaim(Df), Bi
hfact(r), F i hfact(h ^ r ) f), F i
hsince(Df, r, h ^ r ) f ! Dh), F i hsince(Dd,m, d ^m) f ! Df), Bi
hwhy(Df), Bi
hwhy(Dd), Bi hwhy(m), Bi hwhy(d ^m) f), Bi
hwhy(Df), F i
hwhy(r), F i hwhy(h ^ r ) f), F i
hwhy(Dh), F i
Figure 6. Mixed deliberation dialogue with the justified subject 〈claim(Dh), F 〉.
and since moves forward.
Definition 15. Let DF be a finite dialogue framework and P be a protocol. DF
is closed iff there is no m ∈ P (DF ) such that the speech act of m is why(a), or it
is since(A! a) where, for all c ∈ A, there is a move n in DF such that the speech
act of n is since(B ! b) and c ∈ B.
We show that subjects of forward deliberation dialogues interpret their dialogue
goals, i.e., subordinate desires, defined on collaborative theories built through the
dialogues. The following two lemmas guarantee that forward deliberation dialogues
are sound in the sense that justified subjects are necessarily subordinate desires in
the collaborative theory, and complete in the sense that subordinate desires in the
collaborative theory are necessarily justified subjects.
Lemma 1. Let DF be a closed forward deliberation dialogue for which the subject
is 〈claim(Dh), F 〉. If 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified in DF , then there is Dg ∈ T (DF )
such that Dh is a subordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
The following Lemma 2 assures that forward deliberation dialogues are complete
in the sense that subordinate desires in the collaborative theory are necessarily
justified subjects.
Lemma 2. Let DF be a closed forward deliberation dialogue for which the subject
is 〈claim(Dh), F 〉. If there is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a subordinate desire of
Dg in T (DF ) then 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified in DF .
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let DF be a closed forward deliberation dialogue whose subject is
〈claim(Dh), F 〉. 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified in DF iff there is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such
that Dh is a subordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
6.2. Backward Deliberation Dialogues for Justifying Superordinate Desires
Subject status of backward deliberation dialogues interpret their dialogue goals,
i.e., superordinate desires, defined on collaborative theories built through the dia-
logues. The following theorem can be shown similarly to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let DF be a closed backward deliberation dialogue for which the
subject is 〈claim(Dh), B〉. Actually, 〈claim(Dh), B〉 is justified in DF iff there is
Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a superordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
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Figure 7. System overview of mixed deliberation dialogue
6.3. Mixed Deliberation Dialogues for Justifying Reconciliatory Desires
Subjects status of mixed deliberation dialogues interpret their dialogue goals, i.e.,
reconciliatory desires, defined on collaborative theories built through the dialogues.
The following Lemma 3 guarantees that mixed deliberation dialogues are sound in
the sense that justified subjects are necessarily reconciliatory desires in collabora-
tive theories.
Lemma 3. Let X ∈ {B,F} and DF be a closed mixed deliberation dialogue for
which the subject is 〈claim(Dh), X〉. If 〈claim(Dh), X〉 is justified in DF then
there is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a reconciliatory desire of Dg in T (DF ).
Lemma 4. Let X ∈ {F,B} and DF be a closed mixed deliberation dialogue for
which the subject is 〈claim(Dh), X〉. If Dg ∈ T (DF ) exists such that Dh is a
reconciliatory desire of Dg in T (DF ), then 〈claim(Dh), X〉 is justified in DF .
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. Let X ∈ {F,B} and DF be a closed mixed deliberation dialogue
for which the subject is 〈claim(Dh), X〉. There is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a
reconciliatory desire of Dg in T (DF ) iff 〈claim(Dh), X〉 is justified in DF .
6.4. Illustrative Example of Mixed Deliberation Dialogues
This section gives an illustrative example to show how mixed deliberation dia-
logues unfold by agents. In Figure 7, we show information flows of our dialogue
systems where moves from agents constitute a dialogue framework, and facts from
the framework constitute a collaborative theory. Reconciliatory (resp. subordinate,
superordinate) desires defined in the collaborative theory give a justification to
mixed (resp. forward, backward) deliberation dialogues, and justified claims in the
dialogue give a justification to multiagent decision making.
So far, however, we paid no attention to agent models (the leftmost component
in Figure 7) such as agent’s knowledge base nor agent’s dialogue strategy. This is
because we focus on dialogue protocols that should be distinguished from them. A
dialogue protocol deals with moves agents are allowed to put forward in dialogues.
On the other hand, a dialogue strategy deals with moves agents actually put for-
ward in dialogues. Agents knowledge base defines moves she can make from her
knowledge base, and this information affects her strategy of what to say in dia-
logues. However, it does not affect dialogue protocols of what moves she is allowed
to put forward.
However, we think that agents’ knowledge and strategies are necessary to show
how a dialogue unfold by them. In this section, we assume two agents agent1 and
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agent2 who have the following knowledge bases, T1, T2 ⊆ L0 ∪ L1, respectively.
T1 = {Dd, v ⇒ d,m, r, a⇒ ec}
T2 = {Dec, v ⇒ ec, d ∧m⇒ f, h ∧ r ⇒ f}
Moreover, we assume the simple strategy that each agent willingly and honestly
participates in dialogues with no particular order. By permission of a given dialogue
protocol, each agent puts forward fact and since moves she can make from her
knowledge base. She also puts forward why moves in any time and claim moves in
the beginning of dialogues.
For example, consider the situation where agent1 starts a dialogue on the subject
whether v (i.e., “voting”) is a subordinate (and therefore reconciliatory) desire or
not.
Utterer Move Attack-to Status
agent1 〈claim(Dv), F 〉 - overruled
agent2 〈why(Dv), F 〉 〈claim(Dv), F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈since(Dd , v ⇒ d ! Dv),F 〉 〈why(Dv), F 〉 justified
agent2 〈why(Dd), F 〉 〈since(Dd , v ⇒ d ! Dv),F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈why(v ⇒ d), F 〉 〈since(Dd , v ⇒ d ! Dv),F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈fact(Dd), F 〉 〈why(Dd), F 〉 justified
agent1 〈fact(v ⇒ d), F 〉 〈why(v ⇒ d), F 〉 justified
agent2 〈claim(D¬v), F 〉 〈claim(Dv), F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈why(D¬v), F 〉 〈claim(D¬v), F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈since(Dec, v ⇒ ¬ec ! D¬v),F 〉 〈why(D¬v), F 〉 justified
agent1 〈why(Dec), F 〉 〈since(Dec, v ⇒ ¬ec ! D¬v),F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈why(v ⇒ ¬ec), F 〉 〈since(Dec, v ⇒ ¬ec ! D¬v),F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈fact(Dec), F 〉 〈why(Dec), F 〉 justified
agent2 〈fact(v ⇒ ¬ec), F 〉 〈why(v ⇒ ¬ec), F 〉 justified
The above table shows a sequence of moves and their utterers, targets and sta-
tus in the forward (and therefore mixed) deliberation dialogue where the subject
〈claim(Dv), F 〉 is overruled. Now, consider the another situation where agent1
starts another dialogue on the subject whether h (i.e., “head cmte administrative
only”) is a reconciliatory desire or not.
Utterer Move Attack-to Status
agent2 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 - justified
agent1 〈why(Dh), F 〉 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈since(Df , r , h ∧ r ⇒ f ! Dh),F 〉 〈why(Dh), F 〉 justified
agent1 〈why(Df), F 〉 〈since(Df , r , h ∧ r ⇒ f ! Dh),F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈why(h ∧ r ⇒ f), F 〉 〈since(Df , r , h ∧ r ⇒ f ! Dh),F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈why(r), F 〉 〈since(Df , r , h ∧ r ⇒ f ! Dh),F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈claim(Df), B〉 〈why(Df), F 〉 justified
agent2 〈fact(h ∧ r ⇒ f), F 〉 〈why(h ∧ r ⇒ f), F 〉 justified
agent1 〈fact(r), F 〉 〈why(r), F 〉 justified
agent1 〈why(Df), B〉 〈claim(Df), B〉 overruled
agent2 〈since(Dd ,m, d ∧m ⇒ f ! Df ),B〉 〈why(Df), B〉 justified
agent1 〈why(Dd), B〉 〈since(Dd ,m, d ∧m ⇒ f ! Df ),B〉 overruled
agent1 〈why(m), B〉 〈since(Dd ,m, d ∧m ⇒ f ! Df ),B〉 overruled
agent1 〈why(d ∧m⇒ f), B〉 〈since(Dd ,m, d ∧m ⇒ f ! Df ),B〉 overruled
agent1 〈fact(Dd), B〉 〈why(Dd), B〉 justified
agent1 〈fact(m), B〉 〈why(m), B〉 justified
agent2 〈fact(d ∧m⇒ f), B〉 〈why(d ∧m⇒ f), B〉 justified
The above table shows a sequence of moves and their utterers, targets and status
in the mixed deliberation dialogue where the subject 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified.
We can also see that the subject 〈claim(Da), F 〉 is justified in the following
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forward (and therefore mixed deliberation) dialogue started by agent2. Note that
each reconciliatory desire justified in dialogues is derived neither from T1 nor T2
using forward and backward practical syllogisms.
Utterer Move Attack-to Status
agent2 〈claim(Da), F 〉 - justified
agent1 〈why(Da), F 〉 〈claim(Da), F 〉 overruled
agent1 〈since(Dec, a⇒ ec! Da), F 〉 〈why(Da), F 〉 justified
agent2 〈why(Dec), F 〉 〈since(Dec, a⇒ ec! Da), F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈why(a⇒ ec), F 〉 〈since(Dec, a⇒ ec! Da), F 〉 overruled
agent2 〈fact(Dec), F 〉 〈why(Dec), F 〉 justified
agent1 〈fact(a⇒ ec), F 〉 〈why(a⇒ ec), F 〉 justified
7. Related Work and Discussions
Focusing on superordinate or underlying desires furthers reconciliation. Fisher et
al. (Fisher et al. 1992) argue that paying attention to stakeholders’ interests helps
to find reconciliation in negotiation. Brett (Brett 2014) says that negotiation theory
distinguishes a position and an interest where a proposition is what negotiators say
they want and an interest is the needs of concerns that underlie positions.
In argument-based negotiation and deliberation, the research studies (Amgoud
et al. 2009, Hulstijn and van der Torre 2004, Modgil and Luck 2009) use practical
reasoning to deal with desire derivation and generation mechanisms for knowledge-
dependent and context-dependent desires. They, however, do not address the situ-
ations in which there is no means to achieve original nor derivative desires. Rahwan
et al. (Rahwan et al. 2007) argue that underlying goals improve negotiation pro-
cesses and consider desires hierarchized in advance. In contrast to their approach,
we assume the situation where desires are structurized as a result of inference
by forward and backward practical syllogisms. Our approach is necessary when
agents have incomplete desires, as well as incomplete knowledge. Hitchcock et al.
(Hitchcock et al. 2001) and McBurney et al. (McBurney et al. 2007) propose de-
liberation dialogue frameworks, e.g., DDF (McBurney et al. 2007), equipped with
fundamental elements for deliberation dialogues such as locutions, commitments,
and termination. Kok et al. (Kok et al. 2010) give an argumentation framework
for deliberation dialogue taking into account agent’s preference. However, these
frameworks do not address evaluation of their correctness. In this paper, we gave
proof-based evaluation for correctness of our dialogues in terms of dialogue goals.
Fan and Toni (Fan and Toni 2012) use an assumption-based argumentation frame-
work to relate successful dialogues with admissible arguments in the framework.
Wells and Reed (Wells and Reed 2006) handle a shift from persuasion to negoti-
ation, and demonstrate its effectiveness using an example. Although we also use
argumentation frameworks and dialectical shifts to define our dialogues, the type
of dialogue and the goal of dialogue, we focus on, are uniquely deliberation and
reconciliatory, respectively.
Kido and Ohsawa (Kido and Ohsawa 2013) propose a reconciliatory argumen-
tation system instantiating Dung’s argumentation framework with modal proposi-
tional language and rules of practical inference. Our dialogue-based reconciliation
has an advantage over argumentation-based in the sense that it handles circum-
stances under which individual agents cannot make a reconciliatory argument by
themselves because of lack of knowledge, but can make such an argument for mu-
tual coverage. Moreover, dialogue-based approaches succeed in capturing dynamic
aspects of interaction where individual agents build a theory collaboratively during
a dialogue. On the other hand, this paper has the limitation that dialogue proto-
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cols allow agents to use only practical syllogisms and allow them to attack only
moves except facts. We think that our work can be extended to a general reconcil-
iatory dialogue by utilizing the persuasion dialogues mentioned above and inquiry
dialogues (Black and Hunter 2009) allowing agents to share knowledge to jointly
construct arguments or dialectical trees.
Much work for formal deliberation dialogues has been inspired by studies of
formal persuasion dialogues. Prakken (Prakken 2005) provides a formal dialogue
system and shows that, under some conditions, a proponent wins in a dialogue iff a
topic of the dialogue is defeasibly derived from agreed information. We also adopt a
similar manner in giving the correctness of our dialogue protocols because we agree
with Carlson’s idea (Carlson 1983), cited by Prakken (Prakken 2005, 2006), that
“whereas logic defines the conditions under which a proposition is true, dialogue
systems define the conditions under which an utterance is appropriate, and this
is the case if the utterance furthers the goal of the dialogue in which it is made.”
However, our dialogue protocols are completely different to Prakken’s because of
differences of dialogue types and goals. It is true that there are various ingredients
associated with formal dialogues, e.g., locution, reply, commitment, turntaking,
termination, and outcomes, and our protocols deal with some of them, in contrast
to Prakken’s protocols. However, our approach does not conflict with his approach
because, as Prakken mentioned in (Prakken 2005), his structure of dialogues is
especially suited for “verbal struggles” and he does not claim that all dialogues
should or do conform to the structure. In fact, our dialogues have little interest in
commitment because consistency evaluation of locutions in terms of commitment
does not directly contribute to the solution of Kowalski and Tonis scenario. This
is supported by the fact that Kowalski and Toni’s scenario makes no mention of
agent’s commitment in the process of reaching the reconciliatory solution. Our
dialogues neither have an interest in an wining-or-losing criterion because agents
do not compete against each other with the different roles, a proponent and an
opponent, but collaborate each other to find a reconciliation. Turntaking is neither
an essential because agents having the same role do not need to be distinguished.
A termination criterion is not essential because Dung’s grounded semantics allows
us to give outcomes of any particular situation of dialogues. It is true that all of
these factors make our dialogues more realistic and sound. However, pursuing a
generality of reconciliatory dialogues is beyond the scope of this paper.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed a mixed deliberation dialogue for reconciliatory desires. A mixed
deliberation dialogue is defined as a combination of forward and backward delib-
eration dialogues for which the goals are subordinate and superordinate desires,
respectively. We showed the correctness of dialogues based on the fact that the
subject of closed mixed deliberation dialogue is justified iff the subject is a recon-
ciliatory desire of a desire in the collaborative theory, i.e., iff the dialogue satisfies
its goal. Weaknesses of our formalization are, first, that it restricts inference mech-
anisms to only forward and backward practical syllogisms, and second, that it does
not allow agents to challenge or rebut facts put forward in dialogues. We will utilize
existing persuasion and inquiry dialogues to address these issues.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 1. Let Dg,Dh ∈ L0. Dh is a superordinate desire of Dg in T iff
there is Σ1 ⊆ T such that Σ1 ∪ {Dg} ⊢BPS Dh and there is no Σ2 ⊆ T such that
Σ2 ∪ {Dt} ⊢BPS D¬h, for all Dt ∈ T ∪ {Dg}.
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Proof. It is obvious that, for any Σ ⊆ T and Dx,Dy ∈ L0, Σ ∪ {Dx} ⊢FPS Dy
iff Σ ∪ {Dy} ⊢BPS Dx. So, Dh is a superordinate desire of Dg in T iff (1) there
is Σ1 ⊆ T such that Σ1 ∪ {Dg} ⊢BPS Dh and (2) there is no Σ2 ⊆ T such that
Σ2 ∪ {Dt} ⊢BPS D¬h, for all Dt ∈ T ∪ {Dg}.
Lemma 1. Let DF be a closed forward deliberation dialogue for which the subject
is 〈claim(Dh), F 〉. If 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified in DF , then there is Dg ∈ T (DF )
such that Dh is a subordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
Proof. The following proof still holds when ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai is replaced by ¬ai+1 ∧
bi ⇒ ¬ai. Since DF is closed and 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified, fact(Dh) appears
in DF or there is Da1 ∈ L0 ∪ L1 such that fact(Da1) appears in DF and, for all
i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), there are ai, bi ∈ L0 ∪L1 such that fact(bi), fact(ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai) and
since(Dai, bi, ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai ! Dai+1) appear in DF where an+1 = h. Therefore,
Da1 ∈ T (DF ) and bi, ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai ∈ T (DF ), for all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Based on proof by contradiction, we show there is no Σ ⊆ T (DF ) such that
Σ ∪ {Dt} ⊢FPS D¬h, for all Dt ∈ T (DF ) ∪ {Dg}. If Σ ∪ {Dt} ⊢FPS D¬h then
fact(Da1), fact(bi) and fact(ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai) appear in DF , for all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n),
where an+1 = ¬h. So, 〈why(Dai), F 〉, 〈why(bi), F 〉 and 〈why(ai+1∧bi ⇒ ai), F 〉 are
all attacked, for all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n). Therefore, it is not the case that 〈claim(D¬h), F 〉
is overruled. Since 〈claim(D¬h), F 〉 attacks 〈claim(Dh), F 〉, 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 can-
not be justified in DF .
Lemma 2. Let DF be a closed forward deliberation dialogue for which the subject
is 〈claim(Dh), F 〉. If there is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a subordinate desire of
Dg in T (DF ) then 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified in DF .
Proof. The following proof still holds when ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai is replaced by ¬ai+1 ∧
bi ⇒ ¬ai. There is Σ1 ⊆ T (DF ) such that Σ1 ∪ {Dg} ⊢FPS Dh and there is no
Σ2 ⊆ T (DF ) such that Σ2 ∪ {Dt} ⊢FPS D¬h, for all Dt ∈ T (DF ) ∪ {Dg}. Since
〈fact(Dg), F 〉 appears in DF and there are ai, bi ∈ L0 ∪L1 such that 〈fact(bi), F 〉
and 〈fact(ai+1 ∧ bi ⇒ ai), F 〉 appear in DF , for all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), where a1 = g and
an+1 = h. So, for all i(1 ≤ i ≤ n), 〈why(Dai), F 〉, 〈why(bi), F 〉 and 〈why(ai+1 ∧
bi ⇒ ai), F 〉 are all attacked.
Since there is i(1 ≤ i ≤ n) such that no moves 〈fact(Dc1), F 〉, 〈fact(di), F 〉 or
〈fact(ci+1 ∧ di ⇒ ci), F 〉 appear in DF where cn+1 = ¬h, there is i(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
such that 〈why(Dci), F 〉, 〈why(di), F 〉 or 〈why(ci+1 ∧ di ⇒ ci), F 〉 is not attacked
and justified. Since 〈claim(D¬h), F 〉 is overruled, 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified.
Theorem 1. Let DF be a closed forward deliberation dialogue whose subject is
〈claim(Dh), F 〉. 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified in DF iff there is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such
that Dh is a subordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Theorem 2. Let DF be a closed backward deliberation dialogue for which the
subject is 〈claim(Dh), B〉. Actually, 〈claim(Dh), B〉 is justified in DF iff there is
Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a superordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
Proof. As a result of Proposition 1, the proof is same as Theorem 1.
Lemma 3. Let X ∈ {B,F} and DF be a closed mixed deliberation dialogue for
which the subject is 〈claim(Dh), X〉. If 〈claim(Dh), X〉 is justified in DF then
there is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a reconciliatory desire of Dg in T (DF ).
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Proof. It is sufficient to consider a mixed deliberation dialogue DF whose subject
claim(Dh) is not justified in neither only forward nor backward deliberation di-
alogues appeared in DF since otherwise the proof is reduced to Theorems 1 and
2. So, the only situation is that the dialogue starts with a forward deliberation
dialogue whose subject 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is not justified in the dialogue, and then,
shifts to backward deliberation dialogues and one, denoted by DFb, of them makes
it justified in DF . The subject, denoted by 〈claim(Dg), B〉, of DFb is justified
because otherwise DFd cannot make 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 justified in DF . From Theo-
rem 1, this means that Dg is a superordinate desire of a desire in T (DF ). Since
〈claim(Dh), F 〉 is justified inDF by the existence of claim(Dg), Theorem 2 implies
that Dh is a subordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ).
Lemma 4. Let X ∈ {F,B} and DF be a closed mixed deliberation dialogue for
which the subject is 〈claim(Dh), X〉. If Dg ∈ T (DF ) exists such that Dh is a
reconciliatory desire of Dg in T (DF ), then 〈claim(Dh), X〉 is justified in DF .
Proof. It is sufficient to consider Dh that is neither subordinate nor superordinate
desires of Dg because otherwise these cases reduce the proof to Theorems 1 and 2.
Let Di ∈ L0\T (DF ) be a desire such that Dh is a subordinate desire of Di and Di
is a superordinate desire of Dg in T (DF ). From Theorem 1, there is a backward
deliberation dialogue, denoted by BD, whose subject 〈claim(Di), B〉 is justified in
the dialogue. On the other hand, we can consider the forward deliberation dialogue,
denoted by FD, whose root is 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 where the root is overruled due to the
fact that 〈why(Di), F 〉 is justified. However, 〈claim(Dh), F 〉 becomes justified in
the mixture of BD and FD because 〈claim(Di), B〉 makes 〈why(Di), F 〉 overruled.
Theorem 3. Let X ∈ {F,B} and DF be a closed mixed deliberation dialogue
for which the subject is 〈claim(Dh), X〉. There is Dg ∈ T (DF ) such that Dh is a
reconciliatory desire of Dg in T (DF ) iff 〈claim(Dh), X〉 is justified in DF .
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3 and 4.
